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This comment examines Massachusetts' state and federal court 
exceptions to the American rule disallowing attorneys' fees. Massa­
chusetts follows the American rule with respect to court awarded 
attorneys' fees. 1 Under the rule, neither a plaintiff nor a defendant 
has an inherent right to receive attorneys' fees from the losing 
party in a court dispute. 2 The American rule is a departure from 
the English tradition of allowing counsel fees to a successful liti­
gant. 3 
The American departure from the English rule can be traced 
to the colonists' view of attorneys. The honorable distinction associ­
ated with the legal profession was always matched in popular lore 
by the lawyer's reputation for sharpness and greedy manipulation 
of technicality to oppress the weak and ignorant. 4 The colonists saw 
the English system as favoring the wealthy over the poor and un­
duly burdening the losing party.5 This view of the English system 
1. See, e.g., Lincoln St. Realty Co. v. Green, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 670, 373 
N.E.2d 1172 (1978). 
2. S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES § 12:3, at 463-64 (1973). Of the fifty states, 
only Alaska does not follow the American rule. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (1973). 
For more information on the American rule, see Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 
(1929); Note, Attorneys' Fees, Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. 
REv. 1216 (1967). 
3. See S. SPEISER, supra note 2, § 12:7 at 479. In England, the Statute of 
Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, c. 1, (1275), provided for costs including counsel fees to suc­
cessful plaintiffs in litigation. Goodhart, supra note 2, at 853. Since 1607, English 
courts have been empowered to award counsel fees to defendants as well as plain­
tiffs. Id. at 853. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 
(1976). 
It is customary in England to have separate hearings after claims are litigated 
before special taxing masters in order to determine the appropriateness and size of 
counsel fee awards. To prevent lengthy hearings, fees allowable are usually provided 
for even down to the amount to be recovered for specific services. S. SPEISER, supra 
note 2, § 12:7, at 479. 
4. J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 251 (1950). 
5. S. SPEISER, supra note 2, § 12:3, at 467. For another explanation of the Amer­
ican departure from the English rule see Note, supra note 2, at 1218 (fees provided 
for by statute, but statutes not updated to keep pace with the changes in the Ameri­
can monetary system). 
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of counsel fee allowances as nonegalitarian caused the early Ameri­
cans to reject it. 
Supporters of the English rule contend, however, that the al­
lowance of counsel fees stimulates arbitration and settlement. 6 Liti­
gants are deterred from entering litigation with a spurious claim 
because they fear that they will have to bear the burden of their 
opponent's attorneys' fees in addition to their own. Further, sup­
porters contend that allowing attorneys' fees encourages juries to 
determine damages more accurately. When the fees are not avail­
able, the juries may, as a practical matter, find it impossible to 
exclude attorneys' fees from their minds in fixing compensation. 
Therefore, juries may inflate damage awards in order to provide 
complete compensation to an injured party. 7 
Supporters of the American rule marshall convincing argu­
ments on behalf of their position that neither party has an inherent 
right to be awarded attorneys' fees. They point out that where 
there is a risk of losing a case and being held liable for an oppo­
nent's attorneys' fees, individuals may well be deterred from as­
serting a right. 8 It is a well recognized premise of the American ju­
dicial system that all individuals with legitimate claims should have 
their day in court. 9 
While the English rule may give fuller compensation, it may 
also discourage the poor, in particular, from pursuing their claims. 
Supporters of the American rule fear that the additional cost of 
counsel fees to be borne in case of failure is a burden which the 
impoverished litigant cannot shoulder.lo The American rule may 
also preclude indigent clients from litigating legitimate suits. Indi­
gent clients with meritorious claims may remain uncompensated in 
the absence of counsel fee allowances simply because few attorneys 
will be willing to represent a client who cannot pay a fee or pro­
vide any guarantee that the fee will be paid. 11 There are negative 
aspects to both the English and American rules but a solution to 
the problem emerges from an analysis of the American rule and its 
exceptions. 12 
6. 15 U. CIN. L. REv. 313,315 (1941). 
7. Id. 
8. Note, supra note 2, at 1231. 
9. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,375 (1971). 
10. Note, supra note 2, at 1224. 
11. S. SPEISER, supra note 2, § 12:8, at 481. 
12. 15 U. CIN. L. REV. 313, 315 (1941). 
363 1979] AMERICAN RULE 
II. ALYESKA-EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO THE 

AMERICAN RULE IN FEDERAL COURTS 

Federal courts have traditionally used three grounds to sustain 
attorneys' fees awards in the absence of statutory authorization. 
Two grounds for equitable fee awards, the common fund and bad 
faith doctrines, are still viable. The third, the private attorney gen­
eral rule, has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court 
in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society. 13 
In Alyeska, the Wilderness Society, the Environmental De­
fense Fund and Friends of the Earth initiated litigation to prevent 
the Secretary of the Interior from issuing permits for construction 
of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline. The court of appeals approved an 
award of attorneys' fees' to the groups based on the theory that 
they were performing the services of private attorneys general. 14 
The groups had acted on behalf of the public to vindicate impor­
tant statutory rights of all citizens in seeing that the government 
acted properly in issuing the pipeline permits. Attorneys' fees were 
appropriate to ensure that the great cost of litigation, particularly 
against well-financed defendants such as Alyeska, would not deter 
private parties from enforcing the laws protecting the environment. 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court's decision. 
Justice White, writing for the majority, stated that reallocating the 
expenses of litigation was a matter more appropriate for the legisla­
ture to decide than for the judiciary. 15 The Court ruled, however, 
that the decision did not affect the other traditional grounds of 
equitable counsel fees recovery, that is, bad faith and common 
fund. 16 
The bad faith exception preserved in the Alyeska decision is 
one of the most widely used grounds for recovering counsel fees in 
the absence of statutory authorization. The federal courts have the 
power to award counsel fees to a successful party when the oppo­
nent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive 
reasons. 17 Vaughan v. Atkinson18 exemplifies the use of this non­
statutory ground for authorization of fees. In Vaughan, a seaman 
13. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
14. ld. 

IS. ld. at 247. 

16. ld. at 257-58­
17. See generally Hall Y. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (discussion of bad faith, but 
fees awarded under the common benefit theory). 
18. 369 U.S. 527 (1962). 
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with tuberculosis sued the owners of a ship where he was em­
ployed for not providing him with food and lodging during his ill­
ness. The shipowners failed to admit or deny or even investigate 
the validity of the claim. The United States Supreme Court found 
that the shipowners' callous attitude in failing to investigate was 
willful and persistent. 19 Their inattentiveness to the claim forced 
the seaman to hire a lawyer and go to court in order to get what 
was plainly owed him. The Supreme Court awarded the seaman 
his counspl fees as part of the damages caused by the shipowners' 
bad faith. 20 
The standard of behavior necessary for a finding of "bad faith" 
is not a stringent one. Courts have been willing to find "bad faith" 
merely on the basis of a need for judicial assistance in securing a 
clearly defined and established right. 21 Consequently, in many 
cases in which fees have been sought on the basis of the private at­
torney general doctrine, the plaintiffs have pleaded the existence of 
"bad faith" as an alternative ground of recovery.22 The awards 
based solely on bad faith, unlike those based on the private attor­
ney general doctrine, are of limited help in encouraging an attor­
ney to undertake a case for a client who cannot otherwise afford to 
bring the action. Such awards hinge on the other party's behavior 
and cannot be predicted prior to trial. 23 
The Alyeska Court's decision also left intact attorneys' fees al­
lowances under the common fund doctrine. Under this theory, one 
who creates or protects a fund is entitled to recover attorneys' fees 
out of the fund. In this manner, the expense is shared by all who 
have benefitted through the creation or preservation of the fund. 24 
Any existing fund, or any fund created by the litigation, may be 
used to pay the attorneys' fees. Examples o'f such funds are trust 
funds, escrow accounts, funds in corporate and other treasuries, 
and funds in the hands of a receiver. 25 The courts have expanded 
19. Id. at 530-31. 
20. Id. at 531. 
21. Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974); The Supreme Court, 
1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 170, 182 (1975); Note, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees 
and Equal Access to the Court, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 660 n.4 (1974); Note, 
Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light 
to Private Litigation in Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 737 (1973). 
22. See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); 
Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (M.D. Ala.), afI'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972). 
23. Comment, Court-Awarded Reasonable Fees: Forcing a Segregated Public 
Interest Bar?, 7 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 399,403 (1979). 
24. See generally Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882). 
25. S. SPEISER, supra note 2, §§ 11:13-20, at 416-34. 
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the theory to the situation in which a common benefit has been 
found but no fund exists. 26 Those who receive the "common bene­
fit" are required to share in the burden of counsel fees. In Alyeska, 
common fund and common benefit were lumped together under 
the heading "substantial benefit."27 The Alyeska requirements for 
"substantial benefit" fee awards are that the class of beneficiaries 
be small and identifiable. Furthermore, the costs must be borne 
directly by those who benefit. 
The third equitable exception discussed in the Alyeska deci­
sion is the private attorney general doctrine. This doctrine first ap­
peared in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. 28 Newman in­
volved a successful injunction against racial discrimination at six 
restaurants. The injunction was granted under Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. 29 The Supreme Court held that although title 
II suits are brought by private citizens, the outcome serves the 
public. Consequently, the plaintiff has, in effect, served as a "pri­
vate attorney general." This doctrine was used extensively in civil 
rights cases prior to Alyeska30 and the passage of the Civil Rigthts At­
tomey's Fees Awards Act of 1976.31 It was often used, in addition, 
in a wide range of public interest litigation. 32 The Alyeska Court, 
however, struck the private attorney general doctrine in federal 
question cases. Consequently, litigants seeking attorneys' fees must 
now rely on the remaining equitable doctrines or statutes autho­
rizing the allowance of fees. 33 
26. Id. § 11:21, at 434. See also, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 
392-93 (1970). 
27. 421 U.S. at 264 n.39. 
28. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). See also Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 
143 (5th Cir. 1971) (litigants willing to act as private attorneys general to effectuate 
the purpose of a public statute should be allowed attorneys' fees). 
29. 390 U.S. at 402. 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). 
31. See Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975); Brandenburger v. 
Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 
F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972). 
32. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub 
nom. Alyeska Pipeline Servo CO. V. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Calnetics 
Corp. v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (manufac­
turer of automobile air conditioners acted as a private attorney general in prosecuting 
a violation of the Clayton Act); La Raza Unida V. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 
1972) (private citizens acting as private attorneys general in enjoining state highway 
construction project where strong public policies of environmental protection and 
housing assistance were at issue). 
33. Cohen, Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against the United States: The Sover­
eign Is Still Somewhat Immune, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 177 (1979). In addition to 
the statutory fee awards, there are a number of federal rules of court providing for 
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The Court advanced several rationales for its conclusion that 
counsel fees should not be awarded under the private attorney 
general doctrine. The first argument relies upon the Court Costs 
Statute of 1853. 34 In the majority opinion, Justice White indicated 
that the statute was intended to limit recovery of costs to specified 
sums. 35 Justice White explained that Congress had standardized 
the costs allowable in federal litigation to avoid unfairly saddling 
the losing litigant with exorbitant fees for the victor's attorney. The 
manageability and fairness of awards in the absence of legislative 
guidance also concerned the Court. Furthermore, the Court noted 
that since the federal government has statutory immunity, the par­
ties would not be able to collect attorneys' fees against the govern­
ment. It also questioned the equity of allowing fees against private 
parties and not against the federal government since private attor­
ney general actions are often brought to enforce federal govern­
ment obligations. 36 
Justices Brennan and Marshall saw no basis in precedent for 
holding that courts cannot award counsel fees unless the fee claim 
fits squarely under a sanctioned judicial exception to the American 
rule. 37 Under Justice Marshall's view, fees should be awarded 
where the interests of justice require recovery.38 Justice Marshall 
fee awards. See, e.g., Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923), 
Grunberg v. Louison, 343 Mass. 729, 180 N.E.2d 802 (1962) (allowance of counsel 
fees in a contempt proceeding); FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2) (courts may impose such 
conditions as seen fit); S. SPEISER, supra note 2, § 12:47, at 524 (discretion of the 
courts), § 13:3, at 621-23 (vexatious litigation), § 13:6, at 627-28 (admiralty cases), 
§ 14:37, at 60-61 (civil contempt). 
34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923 (1976). 
35. 421 U.S. at 251-53. Sections 1920 and 1923 enumerate recoverable costs. 
Section 1920 includes clerk and marshall fees, court reporters, printing and copying, 
and witnesses. Section 1923 provides for docket fees and costs of briefs. 
36. Id. at 265-68. See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412, 2413 (1976) (preclusion of 
attorneys' fees as costs against the United States); Cohen, supra note 33, at 179-81 
(federal common law exceptions discussed in relation to statutory fee allowances and 
sovereign immunity); Dunlap, Attorneys' Fees Against Government Defendants: 
Economics Requires a New Proposal, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 311 (1979). For fee 
awards against state governments, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) 
(eleventh amendment does not bar backpay and attorneys' fees awards since the 
amendment and state sovereignty are limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of 
the fourteenth amendment). Section 5 grants Congress the authority to enforce its 
provisions by appropriate legislation in a manner which would otherwise be consti­
tutionally impermissible. Id. 
The award in Fitzpatrick was pursuant to statute. The situation differs when the 
court seeks to award fees on its own authority. The constitutional arguments in that 
situation are not so readily overcome. 
37. 421 U.S. at 273. 
38. Id. at 272. 
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attacked the majority's arguments premised on the Court Costs 
Statute of 1853 and judicial manageability. The Supreme Court, ac­
cording to Justice Marshall, has not used the Court Costs Statute 
as a general bar to judicial fee shifting in the past. He said that ju­
dicial manageability should not dissuade the Court from consider­
ing these cases since there are analogous statutory and nonstatutory 
fee cases which enunciate guidelines which can be applied. 
Justice Marshall contended that while the majority recognizes 
the continued vitality of the bad faith and common benefit excep­
tions, it ignores the theory underlying them. He said that rejection 
of the private attorney general concept contradicted the wide con­
struction given to the common benefit exception in recent Su­
preme Court cases. 39 · Justice Marshall's opinion has received close 
attention. 
One commentator, for instance, indicates how little difference 
actually exists between recent common benefit cases and the pri­
vate attorney general concept and suggests that two different labels 
describe substantially the same theory.40 This proposition brings 
into question the Alyeska majority's distinction between the two. 
Some courts, for instance, find a common benefit when a cause of 
action is brought to vindicate a statute on behalf of the public. 41 In 
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 42 a common benefit was found when 
plaintiffs brought a successful suit to set aside a corporate merger 
accomplished through the use of a misleading proxy statement. The 
plaintiffs established the violation of the securities laws for the ben­
efit of the corporation and its shareholders. The Supreme Court in­
dicated the benefit conferred was the availability of "an important 
means of enforcement of the proxy statute. "43 Allowance of attor­
neys' fees to enforce the statute resembles the notion that the 
plaintiffs are acting as private attorneys general to enforce the pub­
lic interest. 
Some courts, on the other hand, carefully distinguish the com­
mon benefit and private attorney general theories. In District of 
Columbia v. Green,44 the attorneys representing taxpayers who 
prevented the collection of illegally imposed taxes sought attorneys' 
39. [d. at 275. 
40. The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 170, 176 (1975). 
41. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973) (suit under the Labor Management-Relations 
and Disclosure Act of 1959); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (suit 
under the Securities Act of 1934). 
42. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
43. [d. at 396. 
44. 381 A.2d 578 (D.C. 1977). 
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fees from the District of Columbia treasury. The court did not al­
low attorneys' fees under the common benefit theory because the 
benefitting class was not sufficiently definable. 45 The court refused 
to rule that all District citizens benefitted from the vindication of 
constitutional principles and were members of the injured class. 46 
The court found such a ruling merges the common benefit excep­
tion with the private attorney doctrine rejected by the Supreme 
Court in Alyeska. 47 
The result of the Alyeska decision was a drastic reduction in 
the available grounds for equitable attorneys' fees awards in public 
interest cases. This reduction prompted the passage of the Civil 
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. 48 The Act authorizes 
attorneys' fees in the area of civil rights. 49 The purpose of the Act 
is to remedy the "anomalous gaps" in the civil rights laws created 
by Alyeska, by providing federal courts the discretion to award at­
torneys' fees to prevailing parties in suits brought to enforce the 
Civil Rights Acts passed since 1866.50 The problem, of course, is 
that the Act's protection is limited to the area of civil rights. 
Environmentalists and other public interest groups which relied on 
the equitable ground for collection of counsel fees are not pro­
tected under the Act unless they can fit under the narrow require­
. ments of the substantial benefit or bad faith rationales or obtain 
congressional authorization. Statutory authorization is, however, in­
sufficient in many cases. Public interest suits may be brought un­
der a statute which does not provide for attorneys' fees. Another 
problem is the lack of uniformity in statutory provisions. There is 
often authorization for attorneys' fees under one statute but not an­
other in the same general area of law. 51 For example, in environ­
45. Id. at 582 n.9. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. See also Skehan v. Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 538 F.2d 53, 
56 (3d Cir. 1976) (rejection of common benefit exception in which the general pub­
lic derived benefit from requiring public institutions to act in accordance with the 
demands of due process). 
48. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees' Awards Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
49. Section 1988 provides for attorneys' fees in action brought to enforce § 1981 
(equal rights under the law), § 1982 (property rights of citizens), § 1983 (civil action 
for deprivation of rights), § 1985 (conspiracy to interfere with civil rights), the Educa­
tional Amendments to Title IX, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972), the United 
States Internal Revenue Code, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (employ­
ment discrimination). 
50. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908. 
51. See Derfner, The True HAmerican Rule"; Drafting Fee Legislation in the 
Public Interest, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 251 (1979). 
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mental law there are provisions for fees under the Clean Air Act, 52 
but there are not provisions under the Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act. 53 It is also common for a statute to authorize fee 
awards under one subsection and not under another of the same 
statute. In order for Congress to respond adequately to the prob­
lems created by Alyeska, each specific area of the law would have 
to be examined to determine whether authorization of attorneys' 
fees should be provided. 54 
This hit or miss method for allowing attorneys' fees could dis­
courage public interest suits. Fee awards are an extremely impor­
tant element in public interest litigation. Public interest cases often 
involve complex issues of law and fact which require a great deal of 
preparation and expense. At the same time, the suits frequently 
seek injunctive rather than monetary relief and involve clients 
without adequate funds for the lengthy litigation. 55 It is possible 
that the private bar could aid greatly in matters of public interest if 
attorneys' fees were more freely allowed by the courts. 56 The pri­
vate bar cannot accept many public interest cases when a fee award 
does not exist or is insufficient to defray expenses or pay the attor­
ney's customary salary. 57 
III. STATE RESPONSE TO FEDERAL REJECTION OF 

THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL DOCTRINE 

The state courts must follow the federal courts and reject the 
private attorney general theory when hearing a federal cause of ac­
tion. 58 The states may, however, make their own decision with re­
gard to the doctrine in actions brought under state law. Thus, it is 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d)(1976). 
53. 7 U.S.C. § 1361(d)(1976). 
54. Derfner, supra note 51, at 260-61. 
55. Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.D. L. REv. 
301 (1973). 
56. Comment, supra note 23 at 421. See also E. Cahn, Power to the People or 
the Profession-The Public in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970). For 
more information on the importance of attorneys' fees in specialized areas of the law 
see Brown, Calculation of Attorneys' Fees: Franchise and Antitrust Relief, 2 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 297 (1979). 
57. Comment, supra note 23 at 411. For more information on the reasonable­
ness of attorneys' fees allowances, see Id. at 420 (attorneys' fees do not reflect fair 
marketplace value of counsel services or take into account office overhead, or the 
length and exclusive nature of a given case). 
58. See Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920); U.S. CONST. art. VI (the su­
premacy clause). But cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For information 
on the Erie substance-procedure distinction in fee awards see Note, supra note 2, 
at 1218. 
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not necessary that the state courts follow the federal courts and 
sound the death knell of the private attorney general. The state 
courts in Massachusetts and California, for example, have adopted 
opposite viewpoints on this issue. 
California has chosen to retain the private attorney general 
doctrine despite the United States Supreme Court's position in 
Alyeska. In Serrano v. Priest,59 the Supreme Court of California 
ruled in a 5-3 decision that a counsel fee award was appropriate 
where state constitutional rights were being vindicated. Judgment 
was reselVed on the issue of whether a statutory right's vindication 
would suffice for the award. The fees in Serrano were allowed to 
two public interest law firms who represented plaintiffs in a suc­
cessful challenge to the California public school financing system 
under the equal protection clause of the California Constitution. 
The California court discussed the Alyeska decision and found that 
the Supreme Court recognized that the fashioning of state equita­
ble exceptions was a matter left solely to the discretion of the state 
courts. 60 The California court was fully aware of the criticism that 
through awarding fees under equitable doctrines a judiciary vio­
lates the separation of powers by usurping what some consider 
solely a legislative function. The court, however, exercised its dis­
cretion and retained the doctrine. The court proposed basic factors 
to be considered in awarding fees under the theory to control us­
age of the doctrine. These factors included the societal importance 
of the public policy, the necessity for private enforcement, the 
magnitude of the burden on the plaintiff, and the number of poten­
tial beneficiaries. 61 
Justice Richardson, dissenting in Serrano,62 found the Alyeska 
rationale more persuasive than the majority position in Serrano. 
Justice Richardson's concern was the California court's refusal to 
rule on the viability of the private attorney general doctrine while 
the Alyeska case was pending before the United States Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the private attorney 
general doctrine, yet the California majority ignored the Supreme 
Court's reasoning and retained the rule. 63 Like the Court in 
Alyeska, Justice Richardson was concerned with the problem of 
59. 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303 (1977). 
60. ld. at 43, 569 P.2d at 1312-13 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Servo CO. V. 
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,259 n. 31. (1976». 
61. ld. at 45, 569 P.2d at 1314. 
62. ld. at 49,569 P.2d at 1317. 
63. ld. at 51, 569 P.2d at 1318. 
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court involvement in policymaking and judicial manageability.64 
Justice Richardson noted that there is a wide spectrum of rights ac­
corded to citizens under the California Constitution. 65 The consti­
tution protects such fundamental rights as life and liberty and also 
such accepted freedoms as the right to fish in public waters. The 
wide disparity in the importance of these rights makes it difficult 
for the courts to decide which rights can be vindicated by granting 
fee awards. 66 
Justice Clark, also dissenting in Serrano,67 criticizes the ma­
jority's decision from a separation of powers viewpoint. Justice 
Clark indicated that California judges up to this point have enter­
tained neither the dream nor the power to endorse social pro­
grams, nor to appropriate money to fund those causes deemed de­
serving. 68 He does not want the judiciary to be forced to decide 
which causes are worthy enough to be supported by the award of 
counsel fees. He views such policymaking as strictly a legislative 
matter, not one to be usurped by court endorsement of one policy 
over another.69 The California Legislature is apparently less con­
cerned with judicial enforcement of social policy than is Justice 
Clark. Since Serrano, the legislature has enacted a loose codifica­
tion of the private attorney general doctrine. 7o The statute leaves 
64. Id. 
65. ld. at 52, 569 P.2d at 1319. 
66. ld. 
67. ld. 
68. ld. at 54, 569 P. 2d at 1320. 
69. ld. 
70. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1978): 
Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party against 
whom one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the 
enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a signif­
icant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the 
general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial bur­
den of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate, and 
(c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, 
if any. 
The California Appeals Court held that § 1021.5 was a legislative declaration of attor­
neys' fees policy combining elements of the substantial benefit (common fund/com­
mon benefit) and private attorney general theories. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. 
City Council, 75 Cal. App. 3d 1, 141 Cal. Rptr. 857, 863 (1977), vacated, 23 Cal. 3d 
917, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1979) (distinguishing substantial benefit and private attorney 
general). But cf 381 A.2d at 586-87 (refusing to allow fees for fear of merging the 
common benefit exception with the private attorney approach rejected by the 
Alyeska court). See also Note, Implementation of California's Adoption of the Pri­
vate Attorney General Theory and the Impact of Cal. Civ. Pro. Code sec. 1021.5: 
Serrano v. Priest, 1 WHITTIER L. REv. 259, 275 (1979) (suggestion § 1021.5 intended 
as limitation on the courts' ability to award attorneys' fees). 
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the courts with a great deal of discretion in detennining when to 
award counsel fees. 
Massachusetts, in contrast to California, follows the federal 
courts in rejecting the private attorney general doctrine. In Boume­
wood Hospital, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrim­
ination,71 an employment discrimination case, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court recognized that it was not bound to follow 
Alyeska in its state court proceedings. The court, however, found 
the reasoning and result of Alyeska correct and concurred that 
the private attorney general doctrine should be rejected. 72 
Massachusetts state courts are obliged to follow the federal law 
when hearing a federal cause of action. 73 The state courts have 
the choice, however, when applying state law, of whatever direction 
they deem best in awarding fees under the theory. Their decision, 
in tum, detennines the law to be applied in diversity cases in fed­
eral courts. The Supreme Court recognized in Alyeska that state 
law should be followed in actions grounded on diversity when it 
does not run counter to federal statute or rule of court and when it 
reflects a substantial policy of the state. 74 Thus, a federal court ap­
plying California law in a diversity case should follow the state law 
and allow fees under the private attorney general doctrine. The 
federal courts, however, hearing a Massachusetts cause of action 
should follow Boumewood and reject the allowance of counsel fees 
under the doctrine. 75 A problem arises when a state has not ruled 
71. 371 Mass. 303, 358 N.E.2d 235 (1976). The following cases have endorsed 
the Boumewood rationale. Massachusetts Elec. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189, 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978); Fuss v. Fuss, 372 
Mass. 64, 368 N.E.2d 271 (1977); Broadhurst v. Director of Div. of Employment, 
1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2448, 369 N.E.2d 1018 (1977); Lincoln St. Realty Co. v. Green, 
1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 670, 373 N.E.2d 1172 (1978). 
72. Bournewood Hosp., Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 
371 Mass. 303, 358 N.E. 2d 235, 240 (1976). 
73. See notes 58 supra. 
74. 421 U.S. at 259. See also Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
75. Prior to Alyeska, the First Circuit had fully recognized the private attorney 
general doctrine. See Souza v. Travasino, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975) (inmates who 
successfully challenged prison regulation limiting access of attorneys and law stu­
dents properly awarded attorneys' fees); Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1974) 
(prison inmates brought civil rights action against prison officials, attorneys' fees 
were appropriate when awarded to encourage important public policy enforcement 
through private attorneys general); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972) 
(plaintiffs prevailed in their suit alleging unlawful racial discrimination in defen­
dants refusing to lease an apartment, attorneys' fees were appropriate as plaintiffs 
were seeking to vindicate a public right where damages were little compared to the 
cost of Vindicating the right). For an introduction to federal court application of state 
law in the area of attorneys' fees see Note, supra note 2, at 1217. 
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on the doctrine's viability. The federal court must in that instance 
determine what law should be appropriately applied. 76 
IV. BAD FAITH AND COMMON FUND IN 

STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS IN MASSACHUSETTS 

The Alyeska decision preserved the "bad faith" exception to 
the general rule of no counsel fee awards. 77 One commentator sug­
gested that the exception is presently broader than the common 
understanding of bad faith. 78 The original reasoning behind the ex­
ception was primarily punitive, and the award was appropriate only 
when the defendant was guilty of improper conduct. Courts have 
expanded the exception, primarily in civil rights cases,79 to include 
the situation in which judicial assistance is required to preserve an 
established right. 80 
The courts in Massachusetts, however, have statutory author­
ity to award counsel fees as costs in cases in which there are insub­
stantial, frivolous or bad faith claims or defenses. 81 The statute per­
mits the court to make a finding of bad faith against any party to 
the proceedings. 82 The statute does not provide for specific 
amounts, but instead allows the court to award reasonable counsel 
76. The complicated choice of law issues faced by federal courts are beyond 
the scope of this comment. 
77. 421 U.S. at 258-59. 
78. Note, Attorneys' Fees, 29 VAND. L. REV. 685, 722 (1976). 
79. Id. See also Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963). 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). 
81. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 6F (West 1976). 
§ 6F. Costs, expenses and interest for insubstantial, frivolous or bad faith 
claims or defenses 
Upon motion of any party in a civil action in which a finding, verdict, 
decision, award, order or judgment has been made by a judge or justice or 
by a jury, auditor, master or other finder of fact, the court may determine 
after a hearing, as a separate and distinct finding, that all or substantially all 
of the claims, defenses, setoffs or counterclaims, whether of a factual, legal 
or mixed nature, made by any party who was represented by counsel during 
most or all of the proceeding, were wholly insubstantial, frivolous and not 
advanced in good faith. The court shall include in such finding the specific 
facts and reasons on which the finding is based. 
If such a finding is made with respect to a party's claims, the court shall 
award to each party against whom such claims were asserted an amount rep­
resenting the reasonable counsel fees and other costs and expenses incurred 
in defending against such claims. If the party against whom such claims 
were asserted was not represented by counsel, the court shall award to such 
party an amount representing his reasonable costs, expenses and effort in 
defending against such claims .... 
Id. 
82. Id. 
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fees and other costs and expenses incurred in defending against the 
frivolous and fraudulent claims. 83 
The common fund or common benefit theory has achieved 
wide recognition in both state and federal courts in Massa­
chusetts. 84 This acceptance is consistent with the position of the 
United States Supreme Court. 85 One of the earliest decisions al­
lowing fees out of a fund in Massachusetts was Davis v. Bay State 
League. 86 In Davis, a large number of certificate holders 
benefitted from a suit brought for fraud and mismanagement 
against the officers of a corporation. The court held that the 
plaintiff's attorney was entitled to counsel fees out of the common 
fund created and in the hands of the receiver. The allowance of 
fees often occurs in cases brought to vindicate corporate stockhold­
ers' rights as in the Davis decision. 87 A readily identifiable fund is 
usually created in the shareholders' rights cases. When an actual 
fund does not exist, courts have relied on the common benefit of 
persons interested in the preservation of the same property to 
award fees. 88 
The First Circuit application of the common fund doctrine in 
Kargman v. Sullivan89 illustrates the value of the doctrine to plain­
tiffs seeking recovery of actual expenses, including counsel fees and 
other costs. In the case, the Kargmans, owners of subsidized hous­
ing, sued Boston rent control officials asserting city rent control 
levels conflicted with the higher rent rates allowed by the Depart­
ment of Housing and Urban Development. 9o A preliminary injunc­
tion was granted, but all excess rents were required to be put into 
an escrow account. After the Kargmans lost the lengthy legal bat­
tle, the court allowed attorneys' fees to be paid out of the escrow 
fund to the attorney who intervened on behalf of several tenants in 
83. Id. 
84. Kargman v. Sullivan, 552 F.2d 2, vacated, 582 F.2d 131 (1st CiT. 1978). 
85. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Sprague v. Ticonic Bank, 307 U.S. 
161 (1939); Harrison v. Perea, 168 U.S. 311 (1897); Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567 
(1886); Central R.R. & B. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); Trustees v. Green­
ough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882). 
86. 158 Mass. 434, 33 N.E. 591 (1893). 
87. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Angoff v. Goldfine, 
270 F.2d 185 (1st CiT. 1959); 158 Mass. at 434, 33 N.E. at 591. 
88. Clark .v. Sawyer, 151 Mass. 64, 23 N.E. 726 (1890); Cobb v. Rice, 130 Mass. 
235 (1881); Commonwealth v~ Mechanics Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 122 Mass. 421 (1887); 
Bowditch v. Soltyk, 99 Mass. 136 (1868). 
89. 582 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1978). 
90. Id. at 132. 
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Kargman housing. 91 Although the tenant-plaintiffs were not class 
representatives, their interests were identical to those of other ten­
ants and their attorneys' efforts were primarily responsible for the 
tenants' triumph. Without the intervenors' efforts, no fund would 
have been created and no one would have benefitted. Thus, it was 
equitable for all tenants profiting from the litigation to share the 
cost of bringing the suit. 
Certain limitations are traditionally imposed upon the common 
fund or common benefit doctrine. 92 It should be exercised only in 
exceptional cases which require unusual methods to bring about 
substantial justice. In addition, the attorney seeking the award 
bears the burden of showing the fee claim comes squarely under 
the equitable principle. 93 
V. OTHER EXCEPTIONS TO THE 

AMERICAN RULE IN MASSACHUSETTS 

Massachusetts allows counsel fees when provided for by stat­
ute, rule of court, or a valid contract or stipulation. 94 In addition, 
Massachusetts recognizes the common fund doctrine discussed 
above and provides statutory authorization for fee awards in cases 
of bad faith. Beyond these, there are a few limited and exceptional 
circumstances when counsel fees may be awarded by the court. 
One unusual exception occurs when the defendant is free from 
fault and the plaintiff's injury stemmed solely from a third party's 
bad conduct. 95 If a defendant is held responsible at law in spite of 
his freedom from fault, then the fault-free defendant may sue the 
third party for attorneys' fees in a separate action. A practical appli­
cation of this doctrine is seen in Consolidated Hand-Method Last­
ing Machine Co. v. Bradley. 96 Plaintiff in the suit seeking attor­
neys' fees had been successfully sued for damages for the death of 
91. Id. 
92. Sprague v. Ticonic Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Weed v. Central R.R., 100 F. 
162 (5th Cir. 1900); Keyworth v. Israelson, 240 Md. 289, 214 A.2d 168 (1965); S. 
SPEISER, supra note 2, § 11:9, at 410-11. 
93. 20 AM. JUR. 2d Costs § 86 (1965) (limits announced by courts); Fischer v. 
Superior Oil Co., 390 P.2d 521 (Okla. 1964) (care and caution required in applying 
common fund doctrine). 
94. Fuss v. Fuss, 372 Mass. 64,368 N.E.2d 274 (1977). 
95. Id. 
96. 171 Mass. 127, 50 N.E. 464 (1898). See also Ford v. Flaherty, 364 Mass. 
382, 305 N.E.2d 112 (1973); Buhl v. Viera, 328 Mass. 201, 102 N.E.2d 774 (1952). 
But d. Hollywood Barbecue Co. v. Morse, 314 Mass. 368, 50 N.E.2d 55 (1943) (attor­
neys' fees allowed although defendant was not totally free from fault). 
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one of its employees. The present defendants, however, were actu­
ally responsible for the death. Curiously, the court held that the 
case fell within the rule that a master held responsible for a ser­
vant's acts, without misfeasance on his part, may recover not only 
the amount of the judgment against him but his reasonable ex­
penses, including counsel fees. The rule does not apply where one 
is defending his own wrong or his own contract, although another 
may be responsible to him. 
The third party bad conduct rule has specific requirements for 
its application. The plaintiff in the second action must establish in­
volvement in a legal dispute because of the defendant's breach of 
conduct or defendant's tortious act. The attorneys' fees sought must 
have been incurred in litigation with a third party, not in the suit 
with the defendant from whom recovery is sought. The fees must, 
in addition, be the natural and necessary consequence of the de­
fendant's bad conduct since remote or uncertain consequences do 
not afford a basis for recovery. 97 
Another exception to the general rule occurs in tort actions for 
malicious prosecution. 98 A malicious prosecution is one begun with 
malice. and without probable cause with the intention of injuring 
the defendant and terminating in favor of the person prosecuted. 99 
In Wheeler v. Hanson,100 attorneys' fees were awarded in a mali­
cious prosecution suit after an embezzlement charge. The plaintiff's 
expense in procuring sureties on his bail bond and in employing 
counsel were elements of the damages to which he was entitled. In 
early cases there was a broad based recovery premised on the 
wrongful conduct of a defendant. The plaintiff was allowed to re­
cover reasonable attorney's fees as an element of damages when 
the wrong was of such a character that proper protection of 
plaintiff's rights required employment of counsel. 101 The courts ex­
pressed fear that awards requiring only the existence of a wrong 
without actual malicious prosecution ranges so far afield as to run 
the risk of destroying the general rule through exception. 102 
97. S. SPEISER, supra note 2, § 13:4, at 623. 
98. See generally Stiles v. Municipal Council, 233 Mass. 174, 123 N.E. 615 
(1919) (tort action against council member for damages suffered by wrongful removal 
of city collector, reasonable attorneys' fees were an element of damages); Wheeler v. 
Hanson, 161 Mass. 370, 37 N.E. 382 (1894). 
99. Wheeler v. Hanson, 161 Mass. 370,374,37 N.E. 382, 384 (1894). 
100. Id. 
101. See Malloy v. Carroll, 287 Mass. 376, 385, 191 N.E. 661, 665 (1934) (plain­
tiffs wrongly excluded from labor union, suit brought in equity against officers and 
members). 
102. Chartrand v. Riley, 354 Mass. 242, 237 N.E.2d 10 (1968). 
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Chartrand v. Riley l03 restricts the application of the malicious 
prosecution rule. The court in Chartrand denied counsel fees to an 
improperly discharged registry of motor vehicles employee who 
sought to recover fees incurred in a mandamus proceeding to com­
pel reinstatement. The court found that the allowance of fees 
where a "wrong" exists but no malicious prosecution has taken 
place provides too broad a ground for recovery.104 The rule could 
be extended to include any case in which the plaintiff has to seek a 
remedy in the courts. Such broad application would totally circum­
vent the American rule of no attorneys' fees awards. The limita­
tions on counsel fees in these cases may seem harsh. Nevertheless, 
many actions based on the defendant's wrongful conduct may re­
ceive statutory help in Massachusetts. The statute providing for the 
award of expenses, including counsel fees, for insubstantial, frivo­
lous, and bad faith claims or defenses could provide counsel fees 
for wronged parties in many cases. 105 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Massachusetts courts generally will not allow the award of at­
torneys' fees in the absence of statutory authorization. There are 
certain limited exceptions to the rule. These include counsel fee al­
lowances when authorized by court rule, when the court finds a 
valid contract or stipulation between the parties, and when a third 
party's bad conduct or a tort action for malicious prosecution is in­
volved. The most successfully utilized equitable exception is the 
establishment of a common fund or common benefit. It has been 
particularly useful in the vindication of shareholders' rights. 
Federal courts in Massachusetts, in addition to these excep­
tions, may apply federal equity jurisdiction in cases involving fed­
eral law. The federal bad faith exception, which is statutory in 
Massachusetts, is allowed as well as the common fund or common 
benefit doctrine. The private attorney general doctrine is disal­
lowed under both federal and Massachusetts equitable principles. 
103. Id. For additional cases denying attorneys' fees as damages where a 
"wrong" exists see Saunders v. Austin W. Fishing Corp., 352 Mass. 169, 224 N.E.2d 
215 (1967) (suit in equity by judgment creditor to reach and apply the proceeds of a 
marine policy of liability insurance in satisfaction of the judgment); Manganaro v. 
DeSanctis, 351 Mass. 107, 217 N.E.2d 760 (1966) (partners who brought a bill in eq­
uity for an accounting of the partnership against a third party not entitled to attor­
neys' fees); Goldberg v. Curhan, 332 Mass. 310, 124 N.E. 2d 926 (1955) (plaintiff pre­
vailed in suit to enjoin false representations made by business competitor, plaintiff 
not entitled to attorneys' fees incurred). 
104. Chartrand v. Riley,354 Mass. 242, 243, 237 N.E.2d 10, 11 (1968). 
105. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 6F (West 1976). 
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The Alyeska decision dealt a devastating blow to public inter­
est litigation by disallowing counsel fees under the private attorney 
general doctrine. Congressional enactment of the Attorney's Fees 
Awards Act of 1976 aids those vindicating civil rights, but other 
public interest groups have suffered. There are few groups suffi­
ciently funded to bear the cost of lengthy litigation against a well­
financed defendant. It is doubtful the private bar will take up the 
cause of these groups without adequate economic rewards. Al­
though the current legislative counsel fee awards aid in some cases, 
there are still many areas which do not receive statutory help. Al­
lowance of attorneys' fees for suits brought in the public interest 
would be one method of assuring equal enforcement of all policies 
of value to all citizens. The negative reaction to court as opposed to 
legislative endorsement of selected policies evinces too little confi­
dence in our judiciary. Judges are involved everyday in the balanc­
ing of delicate and important interests. Enforcement of the public 
interest requires the flexibility of court awarded attorneys' fees. 
Roberta Baker Jones 
